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Using a factor decomposition of the Gini coefficient, we 
measure the contribution to inequality of direct monetary income 
flows to and from the Brazilian State. The income flows from the 
State include public sector workers' earnings, Social Security 
pensions, unemployment benefits, and Social Assistance transfers. 
The income flows to the State comprise direct taxes and 
employees' social security contributions. Data come from the 
Brazilian POF 2008–09. We do not measure indirect contributions 
to inequality of subsidies granted to and taxation of companies, 
nor the in-kind provision of goods and services. The results 
indicate that the State contributes to a large share of family per 
capita income inequality. Incomes associated with work in the 
public sector—wages and pensions—are concentrated and 
regressive. Components related to the private sector are also 
concentrated, but progressive. Contrary to what has been found in 
European countries, public spending associated with work and 
social policies is concentrated in an elite group of workers and, 
taken as a whole, tends to increase income inequality. 
Redistributive mechanisms that could reverse this inequality, 
such as taxes and social assistance, are very progressive but 
proportionally small. Consequently, their effect is completely 
offset by the regressive income flows from the State. 
Keywords: Income distribution; social inequality; social policies; 
public work; pensions. 
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his study aims to measure the net contribution of direct flows of 
income to and from the State (wages, transfers, and taxes) to income 
inequality. Our focus is not only on public expenditures but also on the collection 
of resources by direct taxation. Specifically, we simultaneously consider all three 
major types of income flows between the State and families: taxes, transfers and 
payments to public sector workers. We limit our analysis to the direct monetary 
income flows between families and the State. This excludes the distributive 
impacts of three major types of State intervention: taxes, transfers to firms and the 
provision of public services. The former is an indirect income flow; whereas, the 
latter is a non-monetary transfer. 
We are testing the hypothesis that the State plays a perverse distributional 
role in Brazil. The state contributes to a large share of income inequality, as it 
operates its wage and social and tax policies in a three-tiered fashion: on the first 
level, it supports an elite group of workers in the public sector earning high wages 
and with pensions; on the second level, it provides intermediate pension benefits 
and unemployment insurance only to formal workers in the private sector; and 
finally, on the third level, it gives little weight to redistributive measures such as 
taxes and basic income policies for the low income masses in the informal sector. 
This hypothesis assumes that the regressive actions of the State are a 
typical result of path-dependency in politics. Since its inception, the Brazilian 
welfare state has followed a corporatist model that offers protection to workers in 
the more developed sectors of the labor market—including State workers—but 
excludes most of the general population from it. This arrangement further 
entrenched into power certain strongly organized groups, such as state 
bureaucrats and public servants, which exert considerable influence upon a large 
share of the State's social spending and wage policies. 
Inequality is often associated with weak public institutions. We, however, 
offer a different argument. We maintain that powerful public and private 
institutions can, in fact, be worse than weak ones. If the quality of institutions is 
understood only as a combination of their stability, autonomy, and size, then we 
argue that it is not the quality of the institutions that matters most to inequality.  
It is also common to link social policies to inequality reduction, 
particularly by stressing that larger welfare states tend to result in lower 
T 
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inequality. Our study does not endorse this view, as it is possible to have a large 
welfare state that, in fact, provides the bulk of its benefits to the upper middle 
classes, thereby increasing the level of inequality. 
Previous comparative studies on developed countries, predominantly on 
countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
have shown that the State reduces inequality. These studies found that public work 
contributes to reduced inequality (BLAU  and KAHN, 1996; GUSTAFSSON and 
JOHANSSON, 1999; MILANOVIC, 1994), that strong unions and centralized 
bargaining of wages typical of public workers are determinants of lower levels of 
income inequality (CHECCHI and GARCÍA-PEÑALOSA, 2010; GOTTSCHALK and 
SMEEDING, 1997; GUSTAFSSON and JOHANSSON, 1999) and that corporatist 
welfare state policies are more capable of reducing inequality than targeted 
policies because of the "paradox of redistribution", that is, (contributory) 
universalism legitimizes more spending than targeting and it is the level of 
expenditures that matters most to inequality (GOUDSWAARD and CAMINADA, 
2010; KORPI and PALME, 1998; MAHLER and JESUIT, 2006; SMEEDING, 2005). 
Other studies have identified that taxation, particularly direct taxation, tends to be 
progressive and the higher the taxation, the lower the level of inequality 
(ATKINSON, 2003; GOTTSCHALK and SMEEDING, 1997; GOUDSWAARD and 
CAMINADA, 2010). 
While these conclusions depend on the methodology employed, 
particularly those related to how the contribution of social benefits is computed 
(FUEST, NIEHUES AND PEICHL, 2010; WANG, CAMINADA and GOUDSWAARD, 
2012), they seem to hold true for all OECD countries. Our results, however, 
indicate that, except for that which refers to taxation, these conclusions cannot be 
generally applied to a developing country or, at the very least, to Brazil. A public 
sector with well-organized workers and a fairly large welfare state in terms of 
public expenditure do not automatically translate into less income inequality in the 
country. 
By decomposing income inequality, we found that public work - especially 
the public–private wage gap - contributes to increased inequality, probably 
because the labor movement of public sector workers is stronger than its 
counterpart in the private sector. Corporatism does result in a high level of social 
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spending, but this expenditure is very concentrated, resulting in the opposite of 
what happens with targeted assistance. Direct taxes are very progressive, although 
they represent a small share of total taxation in the country. The end result is that, 
in Brazil, the direct income flows to and from the State contributes to 
approximately one third of all inequality in disposable income. The advantages of 
public workers in wages and pensions alone contribute to around one tenth of this 
inequality. 
To a large extent, our study converges with previous research regarding 
inequality in Brazil. In short, the existing studies show that i) direct taxation is very 
progressive and contributes to reduced inequality (AFONSO and FERNANDES, 
2005; CASTRO, 2014; MEDEIROS and SOUZA, 2013; PINTOS-PAYERAS, 2008, 
2010; RANGEL, 2011; ROCHA, 2002; SILVEIRA, 2008, 2010; SOARES et al., 2010); 
ii) social security pensions are regressive, especially due to the high concentration 
of benefits within the system that covers workers in the public sector—in the long 
run—and considering contributions, this regressiveness is reduced (AFONSO and 
FERNANDES, 2005; BARROS et al., 2007; FERREIRA, 2006; HOFFMANN, 2003a, 
2003b, 2009; MEDEIROS and SOUZA, 2014; RANGEL, VAZ and FERREIRA, 2009; 
SILVEIRA, 2008, 2010); iii) social assistance benefits are very progressive, but 
contribute little to total inequality given their small share in total income (BARROS 
et al., 2007; HOFFMANN, 2009; MEDEIROS and SOUZA, 2013; ROCHA, 2008; 
SOARES et al., 2009); iv) wages paid to public servants have a very unequal 
distribution, are often higher than those paid in the private sector and tend to be 
regressive (BARBOSA and SOUZA, 2012; DARÉ, 2011; DARÉ and HOFFMANN, 
2012; HOFFMANN, 2009; SOUZA and MEDEIROS, 2013; VAZ and HOFFMANN, 
2007). 
We do not take into account indirect income flows, in-kind services and 
non-monetary transfers, such as indirect taxes, public education and health 
spending, and subsidies to firms. For the purposes of this study, it is simply not 
possible to reliably estimate their effects on income inequality. Our focus is on 
direct monetary taxes and transfers, not on all possible ways the State can affect 
inequality. We believe the monetary income flows analyzed below are of interest 
by themselves for two reasons. First, the wages and transfers we analyzed cover a 
large share of all State expenditures: in 2006, combined together, wages and 
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transfers accounted for over 21% of GDP, whereas the total tax revenue reached 
slightly over 34% of GDP (MOSTAFA, SOUZA and VAZ, 2010; SANTOS, 2010). 
Second, it is not far-fetched to speculate that the net effect of omitting all indirect 
and non-monetary income flows is regressive. If some admittedly strong 
assumptions are to be believed, then the regressiveness of indirect taxes, interest 
payments and subsidized credit, among others, swamp the moderately egalitarian 
profile of education and health care expenditures (CARVALHO, SIQUEIRA and 
NOGUEIRA, 2013; HIGGINS and PEREIRA, 2013; IMMERVOLL et al., 2006; 
MOSTAFA, SOUZA and VAZ, 2010; PINTOS-PAYERAS, 2010; SILVEIRA, 2010). 
Finally, we should add a remark regarding the quality of the data and of 
our estimates. The survey we use, the Brazilian Consumption and Expenditure 
Survey 2008–09 (Pesquisa de Orçamentos Familiares - POF), has the most reliable 
questionnaire regarding income data in Brazil. Yet, at least one study based on tax 
data (MEDEIROS, SOUZA and CASTRO, 2015b) shows that the total levels of 
inequality seem to be underestimated by all household surveys in the country. 
This, of course, may bias our estimates. In addition, we were not able to calculate 
proper confidence intervals for our estimates. We did calculate standard errors 
using bootstrap procedures assuming random sampling and found nothing that 
should compromise our results. Still, our results should be taken with caution. 
 
Methodology 
The microdata used in the study comes from the Brazilian Consumption 
and Expenditure Survey 2008–09 (Pesquisa de Orçamentos Familiares - POF), 
which was conducted between June 2008 and June 2009 by the Brazilian Institute 
of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), the country's central statistics office. The POF 
has national coverage and a total sample size of roughly 190 thousand people in 56 
thousand households, which corresponds to a population of 189 million people in 
57.5 million households. 
The POF is primarily a consumption-oriented survey but it also collects 
extensive data on incomes. The 2008–2009 survey covers approximately 110 
different income sources with a 12-month reference period, making the POF the 
most reliable survey regarding income data in Brazil. As a benchmark, it is worth 
mentioning that Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD), a well-
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known household survey in Brazil, only collects incomes and earnings for 
approximately ten income sources with a thirty-day reference period. Reported 
income levels in the POF are usually higher than in other household surveys and 
are closer to the National Accounts estimates. 
Our main variable of interest is the disposable household per capita 
income, which encompasses labor and capital incomes, public and private 
transfers, benefits net of direct taxes, and employees' Social Security contributions. 
Non-monetary incomes, such as in-kind payments, were discarded. A negligible 
number of households with negative disposable income were also excluded from 
our analysis.  
Both income and tax data were deflated to January 2009 using a standard 
consumer price index. Absolute income levels are only of marginal interest to us, 
but the tables below provide information on them, presented in 2009 PPP Dollars 
(using the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals PPP conversion factor of 
1.71) 1. 
 
Inequality decomposition  
The measure of inequality used in the study is the Gini coefficient, which is 
additively decomposable by income sources or factor components (RAO, 1969): 
total inequality is the sum of the concentration coefficient of each factor, weighted 
by the share of this factor in total income.  
The concentration coefficient ranges from −1 to +1, attaining its minimum 
value when all income from source k flows to the poorest individual in the overall 
distribution of income, and its maximum when flowing to the richest individual. 
However, when a factor component has both positive and negative values, there is 
a possibility that both its Gini and concentration coefficient might fall outside the 
(0,1) and (−1,1) ranges, respectively (CHEN, TSAUR AND RHAI, 1982; PYATT, 
CHEN and FEI, 1980; RAO, 1969). This is of concern as, for instance, both the 
public–private wage gap and the net State-related income components are 
expected to have both positive and negative values.  
There are three alternatives for dealing with this situation. The first option 
is to adjust the scale of the Gini. The downside to this approach is that it creates the 
                                                            
1 See: <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=699>. 
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impression of an artificial reduction of the measured levels of inequality. The 
second option is to divide the factor component with positive and negative values 
in the two sub-factors, one with only positive values and the other with only 
negative ones. The third option is not to make any adjustments and accept 
concentration coefficients outside the conventional range.  
Because our main objective is to estimate the relative contribution of 
income factor components to total inequality, we opted for the last two options, 
that is, to disaggregate all factors with positive and negative values into sub-factors 
with strictly non-positive and non-negative values, while also accepting an 
unconventional range for the original factor. By doing so, we did not compromise 
the comparability of our results with other studies.  
The factor decomposition of the Gini coefficient allows us to calculate the 
income elasticity, or marginal effect on the contribution of each factor, to total 
inequality (LERMAN and YITZHAKI, 1985; STARK, TAYLOR and YITZHAKI, 1986). 
This elasticity indicates how a change in the share of a factor would affect total 
inequality. An income factor is "progressive" if it is less unequally distributed than 
total income; conversely, it is "regressive" if it is more unequally distributed. If a 
factor component of income is regressive, then its relative contribution to total 
inequality is higher than its income share and its marginal effect is inequality-
increasing.  
In order to carry out the decomposition of the Gini coefficient, we began 
by dividing the disposable household income into three major groups: income 
flows from the State, to the State, and from the Private Sector. We then further 
subdivided the first two groups, as explained below. Incomes from the Private 
Sector were disaggregated solely into labor earnings and other incomes. The latter 
comprises a heterogeneous composition of income sources, such as capital and 
property, alimony, private pension plans, scholarships, and so on.  
 
Income flows from the State 
 
Public servants' earnings 
Because of market segmentation, we treat the earnings of public servants 
as the sum of two components: their (counterfactual) private sector market 
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earnings and the public–private wage differential. There are at least two possible 
explanations for this division and they can both be important determinants of the 
wage differences between the public and the private sectors. First, the wage setting 
mechanisms in the two sectors are different, with public sector wage values being 
highly influenced by political factors. Second, the characteristics of the public 
sector workers may also be different. To estimate these counterfactual wages, we 
resorted to the decomposition proposed by Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (JMP), which 
allowed us to isolate the differential effects of coefficients (prices), observed 
characteristics (quantities) and residual effects using linear regressions (JUHN, 
MURPHY and PIERCE, 1993). First, we estimated a wage equation for the reference 
group, the public sector workers, and an equation for the equivalent group, the 
private sector workers. Then, we applied the regression parameters and the 
distribution of residuals from the equivalent group to the reference group to 
estimate the counterfactual wage of public sector workers. By subtracting the two, 
we obtained the wage differential.  
We defined the group of comparable private sectors workers as all non-
domestic formal private sector employees, which were identified as those 
individuals with private sector jobs who reported Social Security contributions and 
whose earnings were equal to the minimum wage or higher.  
As the assumption that workers are randomly assigned between sectors is 
obviously not true, we tested three different specifications of our model. First, we 
estimated the wage equations without any sort of correction for selection bias. 
Then, we tested two different selection models and subsequently added the 
relevant Inverse Mills Ratios (IMRs) to the wage equations: a public or formal 
private job probit (only for those working in the formal sector, public or 
otherwise); and a work/does not work probit. The additional identification 
variables were the relationship to the household head (four dummies; household 
head as reference), the presence of children in the household (dummies for 
children aged 0–6 and 7–15 years) and the presence of other public sector workers 
in the household. 
The wage equations themselves used the standard set of independent 
variables: education (six dummy variables; four years of schooling or less as 
reference); age and age squared; duration of job tenure (two dummies; workers 
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with less than a month on the job as reference); gender (one dummy variable for 
men); race (one dummy variable for whites and Asians); states (26 dummy 
variables; state of Rondônia as reference); urbanization status (one dummy 
variable for urban areas). The dependent variable was the log of the monthly 
earnings. 
All three models yielded similar results. The public–private wage gap was 
approximately 24%, that is, public servants earned on average 22% more than 
they would earn in the private sector, given their observable characteristics. 
Moreover, the Gini coefficient for counterfactual wages was between 15% and 
20% lower than the Gini for observed wages. Therefore, we judged the results to 
be sufficiently robust to changes in definitions and model specifications such to 
allow us to present only the results based on the model with no correction for 
selection bias. 
One could argue that our model might still be biased, insofar as our set of 
independent variables and selection equations do not fully take into account a host 
of potential selection biases. There is no conclusive evidence either way. However, 
it is worth mentioning that our results are consistent with estimates based on 
different methods and data sets (BARBOSA, 2012; BARBOSA and SOUZA, 2012; 
VAZ and HOFFMANN, 2007).  
 
Social security pensions 
Brazilian public pensions are organized as a mandatory pay-as-you-go 
system and divided into two subsystems, or regimes: one for private sector 
workers and another for public sector workers. The private sector regime has a 
legal cap that limits the values of its pensions and the employees' Social Security 
contributions. This cap does not apply to the public sector pensions. Recent 
reforms have changed this, but they will take a long time to take effect, as the cap 
will be imposed only upon workers who joined the public sector after the reforms 
were signed into law. Even then, there will remain some important differences, as 
these reforms also created partly subsidized voluntary retirement funds to 
supplement public servants' pensions.  
The second important difference relates to the role of the minimum wage, 
which is the legal basis for all Social Security benefits. While there are very few 
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minimum wage recipients among retired public servants, approximately two-
thirds of all private sector pensions are at the minimum wage level (R$ 465 as of 
June 2009, or PPP$ 272)). This means that the annual adjustments to the minimum 
wage have a huge impact on these private sector pensions, which become 
independent from their recipients' contributions. The third difference relates to 
the rules governing the adjustment of the benefits. For private sector workers, 
benefits either follow the minimum wage or are otherwise adjusted annually for 
inflation. Former public servants, however, enjoy earnings parity with current 
public servants, as their pension benefits automatically reflect any rise in the 
wages of current servants. While the reforms approved in 2003 and 2005 have 
eliminated this privilege, all public servants who joined the public sector before 
2003 are eligible for pensions with earnings parity. 
In summary, it is hardly controversial to posit that the rules governing 
public servants' pensions are more generous than those rules for private sector 
pensions. Both regimes run significant annual deficits–between 1% (private sector 
regime) and 2% (public servants' regime) of GDP - and thus have to be partially 
subsidized by the State.  
For the Gini decomposition, the public pension incomes were first divided 
into pensions for private sector workers and for public sector workers. This latter 
group was further subdivided into pensions equal to or below the cap, and 
pensions above the cap. Finally, pensions above the cap were split into two income 
components, one equal to the cap and the other representing the "surplus" enjoyed 
by some retired public servants, as they are not subjected to the pension cap 
applied to private sector workers.  
 
Social assistance transfers 
Social Assistance encompasses all non-contributory cash benefits, except 
for the Rural Pensions, which are part of the Social Security pensions. Two major 
federal programs are responsible for almost all transfers: the Benefício de 
Prestação Continuada (BPC) and the Bolsa Família. The BPC is an unconditional 
monthly benefit equal to one minimum wage targeted to poor people aged 65 or 
older or with severe disabilities.  
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Unemployment benefits 
There are two major types of unemployment benefits available mostly for 
formal wage workers in the private sector. The first is the Fundo de Garantia por 
Tempo de Serviço (FGTS), a mandatory individual savings account. Workers can 
withdraw their savings upon dismissal or under certain other conditions. The 
second type of benefit is the Seguro Desemprego, a traditional temporary 
unemployment insurance transfer paid to formal workers upon their dismissal. 
Unlike the FGTS, the Seguro Desemprego has both a floor (the minimum wage) and 
a cap (usually between 160% and 180% of the minimum wage). Both the FGTS and 
the traditional unemployment insurance were classified as "unemployment 
benefits" and computed as they are in the database. 
 
Direct income flows to the State 
Direct income flows to the State comprise direct taxes and employees' 
contributions to Social Security. Taxes include all direct taxes registered by our 
survey, with income, vehicle, and land taxes being the most important ones by far. 
Social Security contributions were divided into two income factor 
components, contributions to the private sector regimes, and those to the public 
sector regimes. Most active public and private sector workers' pay a flat rate of 
approximately 11% of their wages (in the latter case, only up to the value of the 
wages below the pension cap). Public sector pensioners–whose Social Security 
contributions had to be imputed - pay the same rate on the portion of their 
pensions that exceeds the cap.  
Public sector workers' contributions were divided into contributions up to 
the cap, and those above the cap. Finally, this last factor was split into the share of 
contributions equaling the cap, and the share exceeding the cap. Thus, whenever 
public sector workers earned twice as much as the benefit cap, their Social Security 
contributions were split evenly between the latter two components of total 
income. We did not take into account the employers' contributions to Social 
Security in either the public or the private sector. 
 
Results and discussion 
Descriptive statistics for the factor components of total income are shown 
in Table 01. More than 40% of the household disposable income flows from State 
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transfers and payments, which are delivered to families encompassing almost two-
thirds of the total population. Once we subtract the taxes and contributions, the net 
income flow from the State falls to 30% of the disposable income. Only 10% of the 
population lives in households that neither pay nor receive any money to/from the 
State. 
 
Table 01. Income components' descriptive statistics, Brazil - 2008–2009 
Factor Components of Total Income 
Monthly per 
capita income 
% of DPI 









1 Public servants' earnings  66 18.3 15.5 427 
1.1 Simulated 54 15.0 15.5 349 
1.2 Public–private wage gap 12 3.3 15.5 78 
 1.2.1. Positive 14 4.0 8.2 174 
 1.2.2. Negative -02 -0.6 7.3 -30 
2 Unemployment benefits 05 1.3 16.3 29 
3 Social Security pensions 74 20.4 30.9 239 
3.1 Private sector 51 14.1 28.0 182 
3.2 Public sector 23 6.3 4.3 534 
 3.2.1 <= pension cap 09 2.4 3.5 241 
 3.2.2 > pension cap 14 4.0 1.0 1,448 
  3.2.2.1 Share = cap 06 1.7 1.0 638 
  3.2.2.2 Share > cap 08 2.2 1.0 810 
4 Social assistance transfers 04 1.0 21.2 17 
5 Private Sector labor earnings 227 62.8 86.1 264 
6 Other Private Sector incomes 27 7.6 24.6 112 
7 Taxes -41 -11.4 72.2 -57 
7.1 Direct taxes -27 -7.6 60.5 -45 
7.2 Social Security contributions -14 -3.8 50.9 -27 
 7.2.1 Private sector -08 -2.2 41.4 -19 
 7.2.2 Public sector -06 -1.6 14.8 -39 
  7.2.2.1 <= pension cap -02 -0.7 12.5 -20 
  7.2.2.2 > pension cap -03 -0.9 7.5 -44 
   7.2.2.2.1 Share = cap -01 -0.3 2.1 -55 
   7.2.2.2.2 Share > cap -02 -0.6 7.5 -28 
8 Disposable per capita income 362 100.0 99.9 362 
8.1 State, gross 149 41.0 65.1 228 
8.2 State, net 107 29.7 89.9 119 
Source: POF 2008–2009. 
Note: The columns refer to average monthly household per capita income, percentage of 
household disposable per capita income, percentage of the population in affected 
households and average monthly household per capita income, conditional on being 
affected. Public servants' earnings is the simulated counterfactual (1.1) plus the public–
private wage gap (1.2). The gap is positive when observed earnings are higher than the 
ones simulated by the JMP decomposition and negative otherwise. Social Security pensions 
is the sum of private and public sector's pensions (3.1 + 3.2). The public sector's pensions is 
the sum of pensions below or equal to the cap (3.2.1) and pensions above the cap (3.2.2). 
The latter were divided into two components, the share up to the value of the private 
sector cap and the share above it (3.2.2 = 3.2.2.1 + 3.2.2.2). The same applies to the taxes, 
which are the direct taxes plus the Social Security contributions (7.1 + 7.2 = 7.1 + 7.2.1 + 
7.2.2.1 + 7.2.2.2.1 + 7.2.2.2.2). Disposable per capita income is the sum of all positive 
incomes (1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6) and the negative incomes (7). The gross State transfers are 
the public servants’ earnings (1) plus unemployment benefits (2) plus Social Security 
pensions (3) plus social assistance transfers (4). The net State incomes flows are the gross 
transfers plus the negative incomes (7).  
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Public servants' earnings and Social Security pensions dwarf other State-
related income components. Consequently, the overall direct contribution of the 
State to income inequality is largely determined by their distribution, which is in 
turn, heavily influenced by the public–private wage gap and the differentiation of 
pension rules for workers in each sector. Wage differentials and pension 
advantages for public sector workers amount to 6% of the disposable per capita 
income and are more than double the sum of unemployment benefits and social 
assistance transfers, providing higher benefits to a much smaller clientele.  
Results of the factor decomposition of the Gini coefficient of household 
disposable per capita income in Brazil are presented in Table 02. The first column 
shows the concentration coefficient of each income component, while the second 
shows the absolute contribution of the factor to the Gini (the product of the 
concentration coefficients by the income shares shown in Table 01), which is 
transformed into a relative contribution in the third column. The last column 
shows the income elasticity of the contribution (or marginal effect) of the factor to 
inequality, indicating how a percentage change in each factor would affect total 
inequality.  
Direct income flows from the State make an important contribution to 
income inequality in Brazil. Approximately one third of total income inequality can 
be directly attributed to transfers made from the State to individuals, even after 
discounting the equalizing effect of direct taxes and contributions. Proportionally, 
the State contributes more to inequality than the private sector. Most income 
inequality appears in the private sector, as it accounts for 70% of the disposable 
income, more than twice the share of net State transfers. However, incomes in the 
private sector are less concentrated and this leads to a contribution to inequality of 
68%. The State, responsible for 30% of incomes, contributes to 32% of inequality. 
The income elasticity of contribution of the State to inequality is slightly positive; a 
proportional 1% increase in net State transfers would increase the Gini coefficient 
by 0.022%. The role of the State in inequality deserves further analysis, 
particularly regarding wages and pensions. 
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Table 02.Income factor decomposition of inequality in household disposable per 
capita income - Brazil - 2008–2009 









1 Public servants' earnings  0.742 0.136 24.2 0.059 
1.1 Simulated 0.702 0.102 18.7 0.038 
1.2 Public–private wage gap 0.922 0.031 5.5 0.021 
 1.2.1. Positive 0.853 0.034 6.0 0.021 
 1.2.2. Negative 0.483 -0.003 -0.5 0.001 
2 Unemployment benefits 0.591 0.008 1.4 0.001 
3 Social Security pensions 0.582 0.119 21.1 0.008 
3.1 Private sector 0.474 0.067 11.9 -0.022 
3.2 Public sector 0.824 0.052 9.3 0.030 
 3.2.1 <= pension cap 0.624 0.015 2.6 0.003 
 3.2.2 > pension cap 0.943 0.037 6.6 0.027 
  3.2.2.1 Share = cap 0.916 0.016 2.8 0.011 
  3.2.2.2 Share > cap 0.964 0.021 3.8 0.016 
4 Social assistance transfers -0.348 -0.003 -0.6 -0.016 
5 Other labor earnings 0.522 0.328 58.4 -0.044 
6 Other incomes 0.729 0.055 9.8 0.023 
7 Taxes 0.707 -0.081 -14.3 -0.030 
7.1 Direct taxes 0.744 -0.056 -10.0 -0.025 
7.2 Social Security contributions 0.635 -0.024 -4.3 -0.005 
 7.2.1 Private sector 0.542 -0.012 -2.1 0.001 
 7.2.2 Public sector 0.765 -0.012 -2.2 -0.006 
  7.2.2.1 <= pension cap 0.571 -0.004 -0.7 0.000 
  7.2.2.2 > pension cap 0.912 -0.008 -1.5 -0.006 
   7.2.2.2.1 Share = cap 0.883 -0.003 -0.5 -0.002 
   7.2.2.2.2 Share > cap 0.928 -0.005 -1.0 -0.004 
8 Disposable per capita income                                           0.561 100 0.000 
8.1 State, gross 0.632 0.259 46.1 0.051 
8.2 State, net 0.602 0.178 31.8 0.022 
Source: POF 2008–2009. 
Note: Public servants' earnings is the simulated counterfactual (1.1) plus the public–private 
wage gap (1.2). The gap is positive when observed earnings are higher than the ones 
simulated by the JMP decomposition and negative otherwise. Social Security pensions is the 
sum of private and public sector's pensions (3.1 + 3.2). The public sector's pensions is the 
sum of pensions below or equal to the cap (3.2.1) and pensions above the cap (3.2.2). The 
latter were divided into two components, the share up to the value of the private sector 
cap and the share above it (3.2.2 = 3.2.2.1 + 3.2.2.2). The same applies to the taxes, which 
are the direct taxes plus the Social Security contributions (7.1 + 7.2 = 7.1 + 7.2.1 + 7.2.2.1 + 
7.2.2.2.1 + 7.2.2.2.2). Disposable per capita income is the sum of all positive incomes (1 + 2 
+ 3 + 4 + 5 + 6) and the negative incomes (7). The gross State transfers are the public 
servants' earnings (1) plus unemployment benefits (2) plus Social Security pensions (3) plus 
social assistance transfers (4). The net State incomes flows are the gross transfers plus the 
negative incomes (7).  
 
Public sector wages 
In several developed countries, public work contributes to reduced 
inequality (BLAU AND KAHN, 1996; GUSTAFSSON and JOHANSSON, 1999; 
MILANOVIC, 1994). This is not the case in Brazil. Remuneration for public sector 
workers is more concentrated and has a higher marginal effect on income 
inequality than remuneration for private sector workers. Public sector wages have 
an income share of 19%, but contribute to 24% of income inequality, whereas 
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private sector earnings contribute to 58% of total income inequality, despite 
amounting to 63% of all incomes.  
There are two effects behind the regressiveness of public sector wages: a 
composition effect and a segmentation (price) effect. The composition effect 
results from the fact that public sector workers are, on average, better educated 
than the rest of the labor force. As such, these workers would occupy the higher 
strata of the income distribution even if the wage structures in the public and 
private sector were the same (BENDER and FERNANDES, 2009; FOGUEL et al., 
2000; VAZ and HOFFMANN, 2007). 
The dividing effect, in turn, is associated with the particularities of the 
public sector in determining wages, not only because the objectives of this sector 
are different from those of the private sector, but also because the collective 
organization of workers in this segment of the labor market is very specific. While 
wage schedules in private enterprises are usually guided by profit-maximization, 
public administrators are influenced by political goals. They may use the State 
wage policy as a means to increase their popularity and gain support from the 
bureaucracy to pursue those goals, which easily results in higher wages for 
government employees (GREGORY and BORLAND, 1999). Moreover, if 
unionization is marked by corporatism, powerful unions operating in the well-
organized and legally protected segment of the labor market can, in fact, increase 
total inequality.  
There is much evidence of composition and segmentation effects acting to 
create a public–private wage differential in Brazil. Most of the differences in 
averages are due to composition effects, yet there is a segmentation effect acting to 
render salaries in the public sector higher than those paid in the private sector for 
equivalent workers in equivalent jobs (BARBOSA, 2012; BARBOSA and SOUZA, 
2012; BELLUZZO, ANUATTI-NETO and PAZELLO, 2005; BENDER and FERNANDES, 
2009; BRAGA, 2007; DARÉ, 2011; DARÉ and HOFFMANN, 2012; FOGUEL et al., 
2000; PANIZZA and QIANG, 2005; SOUZA and MEDEIROS, 2013; VAZ and 
HOFFMANN, 2007; VERGARA, 1991; VERGARA and SILVA WILTGEN, 1995).  
The factor decomposition in Table 02 illustrates the fact that the State 
hires workers with better qualifications than the labor force average–the 
composition effect–, is more relevant for household disposable per capita income 
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inequality than the consequences of segmentation on the prices of labor. 
Approximately 19% of total income inequality is related to the particular 
composition of the public sector, whereas 6% refers to the wage differential 
favoring workers in the public sector. Of course, it is difficult to determine whether 
this differential results from pure segmentation of the job market into public and 
private sectors, or from other characteristics of the workers in the two sectors. 
Still, the importance of this wage differential to inequality should not be 
overlooked. No matter what the causal effects behind the differential are, it is 
extremely concentrated and its regressive impact on the Gini coefficient is 
sufficient to offset over half of the progressive impact of the income tax. 
The public sector has an intra-sector earnings concentration higher than 
that of its private counterpart. Its concentration coefficient is 0.742, whereas that 
of the private sector is 0.522. This, combined with a highly concentrated wage 
differential that on average favors the public sector, results in a disproportional 
contribution of the latter to inequality, 24.2% of the Gini coefficient, when 
compared to that of the private sector (58.4%); which encompasses a more than 
five times larger share of the labor force. In other words, the considerable 
importance of public sector earnings to inequality results from the interaction of 
high concentration within this sector and inequalities between the sectors. 
 
Social security pensions 
The outcome of the combination of redistributive and regressive benefits 
characterizing public pensions in Brazil is far from egalitarian, contributing to 21% 
of total income inequality in the country. High levels of regressiveness are 
characteristic of the pension system of several Latin American countries (ARZA, 
2008; ESQUIVEL, 2011; FERREIRA, 2006; HOFFMANN, 2003a, 2003b; LAVADO, 
2007; MEDEIROS and SOUZA, 2013, 2014; RANGEL, 2011; RANGEL, VAZ and 
FERREIRA, 2009; SILVEIRA, 2008, 2010; SOARES et al., 2009). However, the 
disaggregation between public pensions for workers in the private sector and for 
those in the public sector shows that the system is heterogeneous. With regard to 
public pensions, the country aligns with other countries with a corporatist bias in 
the origin of their social policies (PALME, 2006; PEDRAZA, LLORENTE  and RIVAS, 
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2009; WANG, CAMINADA and GOUDSWAARD, 2012), but with a much worse 
distribution of benefits from these policies. 
In practice, the Brazilian Social Security system is stratified into at least 
three tiers. At the bottom, there are the subsidized minimum wage pensions, paid 
either to former rural or urban workers who were on the fringes of the formal 
market. In the middle, there are the other private sector pensioners and the public 
servants whose pensions are lower than or equal to the private sector pension cap. 
At the top, there are the few public sector retirees whose pensions exceed the cap. 
Public pensions are the most important item of social spending in Brazil. 
Pensions for workers in the public sector are very concentrated–they have 
a coefficient of concentration of 0.824, 47% higher than the already excessive 
concentration of incomes in Brazil of 0.561. Although only 4% of the population 
lives in families receiving public sector pensions, they amount to 6% of all incomes 
and respond to 9% of the Gini coefficient. There is no other source of income with 
such a high proportional contribution to inequality.  
Pensions above the cap have the highest concentration among all income 
components; the share above the cap of these pensions alone amounts to 2% of all 
incomes and 4% of total inequality. Progressive contributions to the system made 
by active workers could counteract the effects of the concentration of pensions on 
inequality, but they do not. Social Security contributions are generally progressive 
but they represent only a small fraction of total income, so their impact upon 
inequality is limited: the share of public servants' pensions above the cap offsets 
almost all of their equalizing effects.  
Public pensions for the workers in the private sector are also 
concentrated, but given the level of inequality in Brazil, they end up being slightly 
progressive. While public pensions for private sector workers represent 14% of all 
family incomes, they contribute to 12% of total inequality. This results from a 
combination of three factor components: first, rural pensions provide income for 
families that otherwise would be very poor; second, the minimum wage floor 
pushes up those who were low income workers and made small contributions; 
third, a cap ensures that pensions will not reach very high values. 
Behind the concentration of pensions is the momentum created by a once 
strongly corporatist welfare state. Even though recent reforms made important 
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steps toward convergence, the more egalitarian rules apply only to new hires in 
the public sector. Unless an equalizing mechanism is adopted, the inequality that is 
already perpetuated by a contributory system will be sustained until the 
demographics of the pension system change completely. 
 
Other direct income flows to and from the state and private sector incomes  
Not all State monetary transfers are inequality-increasing. Social 
assistance - basically targeted cash transfers of anti-poverty programs - is highly 
progressive and contributes to reverse inequality (BARROS et al., 2007; 
HOFFMANN, 2009; MEDEIROS and SOUZA, 2013; ROCHA, 2008; SOARES et al., 
2009). However, as they represent a minor share of the income received by 
families (1%), their contribution to inequality is minimal (-1%). Their impact is 
completely offset by unemployment insurance benefits and individual accounts 
drawdowns, which amount to a minor share of total income (1%). The celebrated 
Brazilian two-pillared anti-poverty system, based on the Bolsa Família and the 
BPC, amounts to a small droplet of redistribution in a large pool of State regressive 
actions.  
Some studies on OECD countries argue that universalist policies legitimize 
more social spending, and therefore countries with corporatist models of a welfare 
state are more capable of reducing inequality than those which targeted social 
assistance (KORPI and PALME, 1998; SMEEDING, 2005). A recent study of OECD 
countries in 2004 estimates that welfare states, on average, reduce inequality by 
35% (WANG, CAMINADA and GOUDSWAARD, 2012). This estimate, however, 
should be taken with caution, as it is based on a sequential accounting 
decomposition, that is, the simple recalculation of inequality after the 
counterfactual suppression of a source of incomes. As Hoffmann (2013) shows, this 
decomposition may imply reordering within the distribution of incomes that 
would result in a measurement of the contribution to inequality lacking 
substantive meaning. When the same data are analyzed with the factor 
decomposition methodology, the conclusion is that welfare benefits play a 
negligible role in reducing inequality (FUEST, NIEHUES and PEICHL, 2010; 
LEFEBVRE, 2007; WANG, CAMINADA and GOUDSWAARD, 2012).  
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There is no evidence that more social spending reduces inequality in 
Brazil. Expenditures for regressive pensions already amount to a fifth of all family 
income–but progressive targeted social assistance has not increased accordingly 
and is still twenty times lower than that of expenditures on pensions. 
In the case of Brazil, it makes more sense to argue that workers in the 
more developed sectors of the economy form an organized interest group much 
more powerful than the unorganized mass formed by potential beneficiaries of 
social assistance. Historically, elites in all Latin American countries used social 
security to co-opt the military, public servants and some unions for their projects 
and to attract support to generate political stability. The result is a stratified social 
protection system where, on one extreme, a large number of poor families can only 
count on meager social assistance benefits or minimum wage pensions upon 
retirement, and on the other extreme, a restricted number of well-paid public 
servants are afforded an outstanding income protection system. 
It seems that what matters to inequality in a late development welfare 
state is not so much the design of the policies (targeted versus universal) but 
rather the unbalanced distribution of power between oligarchies and the rest of 
the population that precedes that design and determines the level of transfers to 
different social groups, irrespective of the aggregate level of spending.  
Taxes and contributions to pensions could reverse the regressive effect of 
social security, as they often do in OECD countries (ATKINSON, 2003; 
GOTTSCHALK and SMEEDING, 1997). Indeed, direct taxation is very progressive 
and contributes to reducing the Gini by 10%. Yet, direct taxes account for barely 
20% of the total tax revenue in Brazil. As a consequence, most of the tax load is 
levied on production and consumption, and therefore paid more or less equally by 
the entire population (PINTOS-PAYERAS, 2010; SILVEIRA, 2008, 2010). Thus, the 
problem resides not so much in the level of taxation, but in its composition. Our 
study does not include individual data regarding indirect taxes; however, it is 
reasonable to infer that if all taxes had the distributional profile of the income 
taxes, then inequality in the country would be much lower. 
The "Other incomes" received from the private sector include real estate 
rents and interests, and therefore tend to be concentrated. Nevertheless, they 
contribute to only 10% of total inequality. We believe this contribution is not 
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larger because a reasonable share of capital incomes are directly paid to 
companies and financial funds—not individuals—and because the incomes 
directly received by families are underreported, as studies using tax data suggest 
(MEDEIROS, SOUZA and CASTRO, 2015a, 2015b).  
 
Conclusions 
By means of its direct monetary income flows, the State contributes a large 
share of the high level of income inequality in Brazil; proportionally, it contributes 
more to inequality than the private sector. Approximately one-third of all 
inequality in the country is related to direct transfers, payments, and taxes that 
flow between the State and families. The two major types of State income flows 
affecting inequality are wages and pensions. The other two-thirds of total 
inequality are related to transfers from the private sector, which are primarily 
some form of remuneration for work. 
We did not consider the effects of indirect flows of income, such as 
subsidies to companies in the form of cash or special credit, or indirect taxes. As 
those subsidies tend to benefit stakeholders of larger companies and those in the 
upper tiers of the income distribution, computing them would probably make the 
State's contribution to inequality even higher. By their turn, indirect taxation is 
known to be slightly regressive; therefore considering this taxation would not 
change our conclusions.  
Contrary to what has been found in OECD countries, public sector wages in 
Brazil are more concentrated than those of the private sector, resulting in a 
disproportionate contribution of public work to inequality: while public sector 
wages amount to little less than a fifth of all incomes, they contribute to almost one 
quarter of inequality. There are two effects making these wages regressive. The 
first one is a composition effect, that is, workers in the public sector are better 
educated than the labor force average, and thus receive higher wages. The second 
is a segmentation effect, possibly caused by a combination of a particular wage 
structure and a selection of better qualified workers through public competition. 
We found that, for the most part, public sector workers are better 
remunerated than their private sector counterparts. This wage differential 
contributes to approximately 6% of inequality. It is a small contribution, but its 
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importance in the long term should not be underestimated as, in the future, it will 
be replicated by the pension system. Neither should its relevance in terms of an 
income flow from the State be neglected, as the effect of this wage differential on 
inequality is sufficient to offset half of the progressive effect of direct taxes. 
Approximately 18% of total inequality is related to the fact that workers in the 
public sector possess characteristics that the labor market recognizes as 
important, and thus remunerates them better.  
Pensions are the second major type of State transfer in Brazil. They 
amount to approximately 20% of all incomes. As a whole, the pension system 
combines redistributive and regressive benefits but its outcome is slightly 
inequality-increasing. Pensions contribute to approximately one fifth of all 
inequality. This occurs because the system is contributory—therefore it tends 
toward the replication of previous inequalities—and is divided into two 
subsystems operating with distinctly different rules. The subsystem for private 
sector workers has a floor and a cap, which restricts the range within which the 
value of pensions can vary. The subsystem for public sector workers, in turn, also 
has a floor but not a cap, therefore allowing much more variation. 
The characteristics and composition of workers in the public sector result 
in higher wages and, consequently, higher Social Security contributions and higher 
pensions. This, combined with the absence of a cap, makes the public workers 
pension subsystem regressive. The share of pensions exceeding the cap is so 
regressive that it alone offsets the sum of the progressive effects of all direct 
contributions to pensions, both from private and public sector workers. It appears 
that this negative effect on inequality will persist for decades, as the convergence 
of the two sectors will happen only in the long term since the equalization of rules 
applies only to new hires of workers in the public sector. 
In summary, there is evidence that the State operates its wage and social 
policies in a three-tiered fashion: on the first tier, there is an elite of highly 
qualified public sector workers with high wages and pensions, which concentrates 
incomes; on the second tier, the State provides intermediate pension benefits and 
unemployment insurance only to formal workers in the private sector–these 
benefits are still concentrated, but progressive; lastly, for the third tier the State 
has highly egalitarian policies, such as exemption from income taxes and basic 
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income policies for the low income masses in the informal sector, but the share of 
these measures within total income is small. The final balance is that the direct 
flows of income to and from the State contribute to increased inequality. 
Egalitarian transfers such as social assistance and taxes are more than offset by 
regressive transfers such as public wages and pensions. 
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